A Review of the Nature and Development of Lying and Deception and Considerations for Teaching Prosocial Lying to Autistic Persons

Abstract

Compared with their neurotypical (NT) counterparts, persons with autism appear to be less inclined to tell lies and less skilled in delivering sophisticated forms of deception. At the same time, some forms of deception like white lies and prosocial lies are frequent in human interaction because they are important for social success. This article challenges the reader to evaluate the therapeutic potential for prosocial deception and teaching white-lie telling to autistic persons. The nature and development of antisocial and prosocial lying in NT development and autism are reviewed. Considerations for when to (and when not to) teach the skill of empathic lying are discussed and recommendations for how to teach the comprehension and production of prosocial lies are offered.

Keywords

lying - deception - autism - teaching - prosocial lying

Learning Outcomes: As a result of this activity, the reader will be able to (1) explain the distinction between antisocial and prosocial lies and how their development is affected in autism; (2) describe person-centered clinical and ethical considerations for determining whether intervention to support prosocial lying in autism is appropriate; and (3) identify three approaches for teaching prosocial lying that are potentially profitable for better social cognitive outcomes in this population.

Lying can be both an early, normative behavior and an eventual problem behavior. In moderation and under the right circumstances, deception is adaptive, but used excessively or indiscriminately, it is condemned. Children must learn the difference in order to lie in a socially appropriate and effective manner. [1]

–on the paradox of lying

White lies are sometimes good for getting along with others.

I don't like lying very much but I've gotten used to gauging situations about it.

Truth is mostly never well received.[2]

–autistic adults on white-lie telling

Lying is frequent in human interaction because it is important for social success. Contrary to popular thinking, lying does occur among individuals with autism,[a] but it is less frequent. Jaarsma and colleagues have observed that “they appear to be 'attractively morally innocent' and seem to have an above average moral conscientious objection against deception.”[3]. At the same time, honesty is not always the best policy in human relationships, and the relative inability (or unwillingness) to engage in deception can be socially deleterious for autistic persons. In this article, I describe different kinds of deception and review the development of lying in NT and autistic populations. Considerations for practice, including whether and how to teach prosocial lying, are discussed. Ultimately I argue that when prosocial lying promotes personal autonomy, it can be “morally good”[3] and beneficial to teach autistic persons the social skill of lying empathically.

The Ways We Lie

Antisocial Lies

From a traditional lay understanding, the term “lying” refers to falsehoods where the speaker's motive is to unjustly escape responsibility or gain a material or psychological reward. In the literature, these are referred to as antisocial lies. This term is an overarching one because, although antisocial lies are motivated by self-interest and tend to occur at the expense of the lie recipient, they vary greatly in their potential to do harm (e.g., contrast fibs and big lies).[4]

As a speech act, lying must be distinguished from other kinds of falsehoods. As Wilson et al explained, “lies are intentional communications that depend on knowledge of the beliefs of both the liar and the target of the deception. Individuals lie when they communicate information that they regard as false with the intention that their listeners believe or act on that information.”[5] As such, understanding the distinction between different kinds of falsehoods requires second-order mental state understanding. Lies are distinguished from mistakes based on what the speaker believes (first-order belief) and from other types of falsehoods (e.g., jokes, honest mistakes, pretense, white lies, sarcasm) based on what the speaker intends a listener to believe (second-order belief[5] [6] [7]). A classification of different kinds of falsehoods in relation to first- and second-order mental state reasoning is represented in [Fig. 1].[6].

Figure 1 A classification of different kinds of falsehoods in relation to first- and second-order mental state reasoning (Reproduced with permission from Leekam SR. Jokes and lies: children's understanding of intentional falsehood. In: Whiten A, ed. Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development, and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading. United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing; 1991:159–174[6]).

Humans have developed numerous ways to lie and deceive.[8] Because the domain of activities and situations covered by the term “antisocial lie” is broad and heterogeneous,[9] it is helpful to acknowledge its many varieties. These include, but are not limited to:

• Barefaced/bald-faced lie (a lie that is obviously a lie to those hearing it).

• Bold-faced lie (a lie told with a straight face and confident demeanor).

• Big lies (a lie that attempts to trick the victim into believing something major which is often contradicted by common sense. The lie may succeed by virtue of its magnitude due to the victim's reluctance to believe that an untruth so grand could be concocted).

• Bullshitting (something that is designed to impress/persuade but is constructed without concern for the truth).[b]

• Butler lies (small lies usually sent electronically, which are used to terminate a conversation; e.g., texting “gotta go, boss is here”).

• Contextual lies (stating part of the truth out of context, knowing that without complete information, it gives a false impression).

• Dissembling (presenting facts in a way that is literally true but intentionally misleading).

• Disguise (deception through misrepresentation of the physical self).

• Double bluff (one intends to mislead by actually telling the truth).

• Exaggeration, hyperbole, embellishment (representing something as more than it is).

• Fabrication (a lie told when someone submits a statement as truth without knowledge for certain whether it is true. Although the statement may be plausible, it is not based on fact).

• Fib (an easy to forgive lie due to its trivial consequences).

• Forgery (producing a signature or document for the purpose of deception).

• Pathological lies (compulsive lying associated with a psychiatric condition).

• Perjury (lying under oath).

• Puffery (exaggerated claim typically found in advertising and public announcements; e.g., “highest quality at the lowest price”).

• Ruse (a clever or elaborate deception).

• Scams (a dishonest scheme or fraud).

White/Prosocial Lies

Although some forms of antisocial lying can lead to maladaptive behavior and serious consequences, other lies are less egregious, quite common, and used as a social strategy to manage interpersonal relationships.[10] [11] [12] These are nondisruptive lies that people tell “for emotional or psychological reasons; to try to make themselves look better or feel better, to protect themselves from embarrassment or disapproval, to try to gain the esteem and affection of other people, or simply for the sake of convenience.”[3] These types of lies are similar to what most people think of as white lies. White lies are untruthful statements about one's feelings, opinions, or personal preferences that are told for a prosocial purpose (e.g., to avoiding hurt feelings or maintain politeness[13]) and they are extremely common in the lives of healthy adults (estimated at ∼1–2 per day[10]).

White lies can be motivated by self- or other-oriented reasons.[14] As the terms suggest, self-oriented reasons relate to the desire to avoid negative outcomes for the self (e.g., being perceived as callous), whereas other-oriented reasons relate to the desire to avoid negative outcomes for another person (e.g., hurt someone's feelings). Learning to tell white/prosocial lies for the benefit of self and others is crucial to fostering and maintaining amicable social relationships[10] [15] and is considered an important developmental milestone.[16]

The Development of Deception

Antisocial Lies

Research on the development of deception has a rich but difficult history. Although it is well documented that very young children engage in deceptive behavior in laboratory[17] [18] [19] and naturalistic settings,[5] [11] [20] [21] [22] a continuing controversy involves whether these children genuinely understand deception and can, thus, use it in a deliberate way.[23] According to the “mentalistic” or “early-onset” view, children as young as 2 or 3 years of age know when they are acting deceptively (and they understand how their deceptive acts affect others' beliefs) even if they are not yet very good at it.[17] [18] By contrast, the “behaviorist” account holds that children have a less sophisticated understanding of deception; perhaps children understand that their own deceitful behavior may result in changes to another's behavior but still not recognizing the intermediating role of the other's belief.[23]

In a related vein, the “conceptual” view (also known as the “theory of mind” view) posits that children's earliest lies are not genuine because it is not until approximately 4 or 5 years of age when children come to understand that someone's action is dependent on their epistemic state. Specifically, many deception theorists[24] [25] argue that a prerequisite for genuine deception is the understanding of false belief:

If children cannot represent the belief of another person, they cannot use these representational states to predict the behavior of that person. Consequently, when they do come to recognize that a person's behavior is mediated by the person's beliefs, whether those beliefs are true or false, they should begin to recognize that an important means of changing that behavior is to change the other's beliefs. The choice to inform, to conceal information, or to misinform presupposes an understanding that if someone is ignorant of the true state of affairs or holds a false belief, his or her response will differ from someone who has the appropriate knowledge.[25]

Because very young children are incapable of understanding false beliefs, their deceptive utterances are often explained by other factors.[22] For example, children who are told not to peek inside a box but do so anyway may report “I didn't look inside” because they didn't actually register that they themselves peeked (they are poor at monitoring their perceptual intake of information), they may not remember peeking following a delay (a working memory limitation), or they may not have classified their peeking as a genuine instance of peeking, especially if it was a brief glance that was difficult to inhibit. From this perspective, the false statements (also called pseudolies) of very young children are best understood as mistaken or impulsive claims.[26] In short, perhaps children deny transgressions because they are not associated with awareness or intent or cannot be controlled.[27] In fact, Ahern et al provided compelling evidence that young children's false denials are “desire-based” responses. Hence, “a 'no' response could be interpreted as 'I wish I hadn't peeked' rather than 'I didn't peek.'”[26]

Newton et al developed a classification of various forms of children's early deceptive utterances as recorded by parents in a longitudinal study.[21] The nature of young children's everyday deceptions, the apparent motives, the kinds of situations that typically provoked the falsehood, and exemplars for each are presented in [Table 1]. As the table indicates, NT children as young as 3 years of age routinely engage in a wide range of deceptive strategies and they do so in flexible and context-appropriate ways.[21] The content of [Table 1] also highlights several challenges in the study of the development of deception. Not only are a wide range of deceptive acts possible, but they can serve a variety of pragmatic functions. Deceptive acts can also be acts of omission or commission and may involve concealment or misinformation so as to create a particular desire, intent, knowledge-state, or belief in the person who is deceived. When it comes to developmental timetables, any one of these factors (or combination of factors) likely affects age of mastery.

Table 1 Classification of the Forms of Apparent Deception as Observed by Parents of 3- and 4-year-olds Over a 1-month Period

Form of deception	Apparent motive	Question/Situation provoking the falsehood	Example
False denial	Avoidance of discomfort (physical or psychological)	Did you smash the egg?	No. I didn't do it
False blame	Avoidance of discomfort (physical or psychological)	Who did that?	Adam Someone else. Not me
False “nothing”	Avoidance of discomfort (physical or psychological)	What have you got behind your back?What are you up to?	Nothing I'm not doing anything
False assertion of permission	Material gain	Who said you could have that? What did dad say?	Dad said yes but ask you also
False assertion of completion	Material gain	Have you eaten all your dinner? Have you put it away?	Yes I did it
False excuses (avoiding)	Avoidance of discomfort (physical or psychological)	Avoiding having to walk Avoiding having to go to bed	I've got a belly ache No. I'm not tired
False excuses (seeking)	Material gain	Seeking push on scooter Seeking medicine she likes	I've got a leg ache I'm sick (coughing)
Bravado (didn't hurt!)	Avoidance of discomfort (psychological)	Receiving injury after being warned of danger	That didn't hurt
Bravado (don't care!)	Avoidance of discomfort (psychological)	Being prevented from having desired object Being threatened with hated toy spider	I didn't want them anyway I don't care
False boasts	Avoidance of discomfort (psychological)	Responding to a friend's boast	I got one of them. (friend) Well, I've got one too
Trickery (jokes)	Amusement (physical and psychological)	No typical provoking situation	I'm going to write on the floor Mom. Only joking!
Feigned ignorance	Avoidance of discomfort (physical or psychological)	What's happened to this place?	I don't know who messed it up (regarding untidiness of room)

Source: Reproduced with permission from John Wiley and Sons. Newton P, Reddy V, Bull R. Children's everyday deception and performance on false-belief tasks. Br J Dev Psychol 2000;18(02):297–317.[21]

The theory of mind view of deception is consistent with the finding that the understanding of false belief predicts deceptive behavior (e.g., false denials[13] [25] [28]). In an experimentally controlled study, Ding et al reported that after participating in theory of mind training (focusing on mental state vocabulary training and training in false belief and appearance-reality tasks), 3-year-olds who had previously been unable to lie began to deceive consistently during a hide-and-seek deception task.[24] Similarly, several studies on the development of deception have sought to connect specific theory of mind competencies with more sophisticated forms of lying. A compilation of these (adapted from a few studies[13] [28] [29] [30]) in the form of a stage theory is presented in [Table 2].

Table 2 Proposed Stages in the Development of Deception and their Relation to Co-developing Underlying Theory of Mind Mechanisms

Stage	Type of deception	Proposed underlying Theory of mind mechanism
Primary stage (ages 2–3 y)	Children begin to make factually untrue statements (e.g., a false denial like “I didn't eat the cookie”), but it is unclear whether such statements are a form of wish fulfillment or genuine deception	The ability to engage in deception in this early stage is attributed to the understanding that seeing-leads-to-knowing (and not-seeing-leads-to-ignorance; e.g., mom didn't see me eat the cookie so she doesn't know I ate the cookie—even if there are cookie crumbs all over my face)
Secondary stage (4–7 y)	Children demonstrate genuine deception but with semantic leakage (e.g., saying “I didn't hit her!” and then blurting out the self-incriminating utterance “and she hit me back!”)	Attributed to the development of first-order (false) belief understanding and increasing self-regulation which allows them to successfully regulate their behaviors and appear honest
Tertiary stage (7+ y)	Children get better at semantic leakage control so they can now tell a deliberate lie while ensuring that their subsequent statements do not contradict the initial lie	Attributed to second-order belief understanding and increasing inhibitory control which allows children to act appropriately while reasoning about the complex interactions between the mental states involved in sustaining a lie
Interpretive stage (9+ y)	Ability to understand white lies with some degree of sophistication and the ability to tell white lies more convincingly	Attributed to interpretive theory of mind which is “the commonsense understanding that knowledge is interpretive and that the mind itself influences how the world is experienced” (Carpendale and Lewis[39])

Prosocial Lies

The most widely used procedure to assess children's understanding of and ability to engage in white-lie telling is the undesirable-gift paradigm. Here, a person receives an unwanted gift and the child's decision to tell or endorse a white lie is assessed. As early as 3 and 4 years of age, children can tell white lies[31] and they evaluate them more positively than other types of lies.[32] [33] Yet soon thereafter, advances in theory of mind lead to more sophisticated forms of deception, as well as the telling of fewer antisocial lies, and more prosocial lies.[34] Nevertheless, most researchers argue that a conceptually adequate understanding of white lies is not achieved until middle childhood (usually 8–9 years across studies) and it is not until this period of development that children deliver white lies confidently and can explicitly evaluate the intention and content of a white lie.[15] [31] [34] [35] It is also not until this time that children are properly motivated to use falsity for prosocial purposes as they begin to appreciate the importance of friendships or more distant family relationships.[36]

The development of white lie comprehension is protracted and complicated for a few reasons. First, from an early age, children are taught implicitly and explicitly not to tell the blunt truth, as it may be both trivial and hurtful to the recipient.[14] As such children come to learn that some false statements, although technically “lies,” are encouraged for social reasons. When this happens, traditional virtues conflict with one another and may not apply to real social scenarios in a straightforward fashion.[37]

As described earlier, many researchers have argued that second-order understanding of mental states (i.e., the ability to embed mental representations: Jamal intends that Joseph believes) is required for the comprehension of, and the ability to tell and maintain, antisocial lies. But white lies are even more conceptually complex. To illustrate, in an undesirable gift paradigm, the child needs to understand that a single gift can support different preferences (i.e., “I like it” and “I don't like it”) that are equally legitimate.[13] This represents the essence of an interpretive theory of mind,[13] which is considered an advanced theory of mind capacity[38] and refers to the commonsense understanding that “knowledge is interpretive and that the mind itself influences how the world is experienced.”[39]

White lies are also complex because their successful deployment has at least two parts: a false verbal component (saying “I like it”) and a deceptive facial expression component (e.g., smiling, looking happy or pleased). The verbal component is practiced and understood earlier than the facial component, which represents one type of a larger class of culturally prescribed emotional display rules.[15] [40] At its core, the understanding of emotional display rules involves knowing that people can manage their expressions in such a way that what is displayed will differ from how someone feels (e.g., displaying pleasure when one feels disappointment or displaying mild irritation when one feels outrage[41]). The display rules themselves are unwritten codes or principles governing whether an emotion should be expressed or concealed[42] and ways that emotions are permissibly expressed in a culture for a given situation.[43]

Lying and Deception in Autism

A handful of studies have been conducted on the ability of autistic persons to understand and engage in lying and other forms of deception. Several key findings from the limited research (conducted almost entirely on autistics with high language and intellectual abilities) have emerged. Overall, there is evidence that children with autism experience significantly more difficulty engaging in deception than do their NT peers. This difficulty appears to be explained, in part, by impaired theory of mind with strong correlations reported across studies examining performance on deception and false belief tasks[1] [44] [45] [46] [47] (for exception, see Ma et al[48]).

Of course, group data can obscure individual differences and although some children on the autism spectrum appear to be unable or unwilling to tell lies, many can and do. When it comes to simple false denials (using a “temptation resistance” or “peeking” paradigm), Talwar et al found that 96% of NT children denied a transgression as did 72% of children with autism.[1] Ma et al reported that 50% of children with autism told self-protective lies (compared with ∼90% in their NT group) and 75% of children with autism told self-benefiting lies (compared with 100% in their NT group[48]). Li et al reported even higher rates for their autistic sample (93%, which was not statistically different from their NT sample[16]).

Another clinically relevant finding is that autistic children who spontaneously engage in lie-telling are usually not very good at it. Compared with their NT peers, children with autism are poor at maintaining lies and demonstrate high rates of semantic leakage which are statements that contradict an initial lie.[1] [48] Moreover, when asked questions about their previous deceptive behavior, the responses of autistic children generally lack sophistication, are brief, are fragmented, and usually omit reference to mental states (e.g., what people think, see, want[47]).

In addition to disruptions in theory of mind, some researchers have attributed difficulty with deception in autism to cognitive salience and executive dysfunction. It is argued that for the autistic child, knowledge of the real state of affairs (i.e., the truth) may be more cognitively salient than the knowledge of someone else's mental state. To lie, mental state knowledge (e.g., what Mike thinks) must take precedence over reality: a process that requires not only the representation of mental states but working memory, executive control, and cognitive inhibition, all of which can be disrupted in autism.[46] [48]

Difficulty in lie telling in autism may also be explained by the strong inclination to “systemize,” to predict patterns in information.[49] The tendency toward systemizing and its application for understanding social rules is sometimes revealed in the biographies of autistic adults. As Temple Grandin recounted:

There is a process of using my intellect and logical decision-making for every social decision… I had a strict moral upbringing, and I learned as a child that stealing, lying, and hurting other people were wrong. As I grew older, I observed that it was all right to break certain rules but not others. I constructed a decision-making program for whether rules could be broken by classifying wrongdoing into [different] categories… Using my system has helped me negotiate every new situation I enter.[50]

From the theoretical framework of systemizing, autistic people may have difficulty understanding and engaging in deception because they prefer systems that change in highly lawful or predictable ways; lying is perceived as an infringement on the accepted pattern of reality.[3] [49] Baron-Cohen described how a tendency for systemizing could disrupt the understanding of truth relations that are not only key to deception but counterfactual states more generally:

Whilst systemizing can deliver truths in the form of laws, it can only do so in domains that are ultimately lawful. One reason that people with autism…may struggle with empathy and be less interested in topics such as pure fiction, pretense, or deception is that these are not and never will be truth oriented… The domain of mental states plays havoc with 'truth relations'... The sentence 'Mary believes that John is having an affair with his colleague” is true if Mary believes it, irrespective of whether John really is having an affair. When we mind read, we have to keep track of what we believe to be true (John is not having an affair) while representing someone else's different (possibly false) belief – what they believe to be true (Mary believes he is).[49]

On the other hand, there are conditions under which strategic deception can be lawfully predicted allowing autistic persons to take advantage of a predilection for systemizing. Indeed, just as Temple Grandin developed categories for understanding moral and legal systems, so too she developed a category for understanding the social rules surrounding truth and honesty:

Through many specific examples, I developed a category 'rude honesty' when I needed to keep my mouth shut. All social skills were learned by being given many explicit examples that I could put into categories like [this]… As I gained more and more experience, I placed each new social experience in the appropriate social file.”[50]

Demonstrations in the empirical literature lead to similar conclusions. van Tiel and colleagues reported that autistic people readily engage in deception but do so through conscious and effortful reasoning about other people's perspectives.[51] That is, people with autism may detect regularities by observing an opponent's behavior (as well as the resulting outcomes) and may use this information to deceive as opposed to the spontaneous mental inferencing processes characteristic of NT deception.

Whether to Teach Prosocial Lying to Autistic Persons

I have a really hard time with this. Even though I … practice by telling white lies frequently, the concept makes me extremely anxious.

– autistic adult on white lies[2]

Lying for any reason is described by many autistic persons as extremely anxiety provoking.[3] As Temple Grandin put it, “autistic people tend to have difficulty lying because of the complex emotions involved in deception. I become extremely anxious when I have to tell a little white lie on the spur of the moment. To be able to tell the smallest fib, I have to rehearse it many times in my mind.”[50] Nevertheless, many autistic persons have learned how to lie (or say nothing) for prosocial purposes. As John Elder Robison recounted, “As I got older, I found myself in trouble more and more and more for saying things that were true, but that people didn't want to hear. I did not understand tact. I developed some ability to avoid saying what I was thinking.”[52]

Jaarsma et al argued that “unless such an education undermines the health and well-being of persons with autism, it is morally good to teach children and adolescents the social skill of lying empathically.”[3] And, in light of the conceptual difficulties and the potential for severe anxiety, there will be times when the social rewards of successful white-lie telling do not outweigh the psychic costs associated with lies of omission (i.e., saying nothing) or even brute honesty. In such cases, prosocial lying is not an appropriate treatment target and a focus on advocacy is more justified. As an autistic adult recently reported on this topic, “I totally understand [why we are supposed to tell white lies], but it's incredibly frustrating to me and I purposefully seek out social circles where honesty is valued and it's safe to speak the truth.”[2]

Crucially, this comment underscores the ethical and ideological discussions currently impacting autism research and reminds us that autistic challenges may be a by-product of an unaccommodating environment and that autistic interactions are optimized differently across situations and groups.[53] The comment is also relevant to the double empathy problem (i.e., autistic and non-autistic persons struggle to understand each other [54]) and encourages awareness of how this problem has adversely impacted previous mental health intervention efforts. When advocacy (not the teaching of prosocial deception) is preferred, it can be pursued by maximizing the goodness-of-fit between the individual and the social milieu, educating NT “others” in how to communicate effectively and “speak the language” of the autistic person, and supporting the autistic person by building self-awareness and self-esteem.[55]

On the other hand, the experience of autism is not monolithic and many autistics report a desire to develop the skill of prosocial deception. Consequently, prosocial lying can be an appropriate patient-centered treatment target when it is deemed personally acceptable, social significant, and developmentally appropriate. The tenant of personal acceptability prioritizes personal autonomy and recognizes that teaching white-lie telling is not conducted with the goal of masking the true autistic self. As does telling the truth in a polite way, prosocial lies can signal personal integrity as well as respect and caring for others. With regard to social significance, prosocial lying should be deemed consequential for improving social relationships. After all, prosocial lying is the communication of misleading information for socially harmless or benevolent motives and so it should not be surprising that white-lie telling can actually increase trust and affinity in others.[56] Finally, with regard to developmental appropriateness, the individual should have the foundational verbal and conceptual skills to understand the nature and complexity of white lies. Empirical demonstrations suggest that deception training will be more effective when an individual has a minimum verbal mental age between 7 and 12 years.[47] They should also demonstrate good executive skills and a conceptual understanding of false belief and second-order belief understanding.

Of course, some autistic persons may not be interested (or willing) to engage in prosocial lying but instead want to better understand deception phenomena to help them reason about statements and manage in an ordinary (not always truthful) environment.[3] When this is the case, the teaching content and processes described below remain relevant and appropriate with the caveat that treatment goals are shifted from lie evaluation and production to evaluation only.

Teaching Prosocial Lying to Autistic Persons: How to Distinguish Lies From Other Kinds of Falsehoods

If a joke is a lie, it's still a lie and lies are wrong.

– an autistic adult on the topic of lies and jokes[2]

Autistic persons who equate lies and falsity may conclude that all nonliteral speech acts (e.g., jokes, verbal irony) are misguided or morally repugnant. Of course, this fails to recognize the conditions under which truth telling is deceitful (e.g., contextual lies, double bluff) and the innumerable circumstances where lying may be considered the good and moral choice. As a first step in teaching (and depending on the conceptual support needed), we recommend that white/prosocial lies be distinguished from other kinds of falsehoods as well as other kinds of lies (see [Fig. 2] for two flowchart summaries of falsehood distinctions). Additional, recommended materials to support conversation and activities to facilitate the understanding (and potential deployment) of deception are available at Theory of Mind Inventory: theoryofmindinventory.com).

Figure 2 (A, B) Visual supports to facilitate the understanding of the distinction between different kinds of falsehoods and different kinds of lies. Reproduced with permission from Theory of Mind Inventory, LLC.

Context Sensitivity in Conversation Lessons

Theoretically I get it but I don't know how to apply it in real life.

– autistic adult on white-lie telling[2]

When falsehood types are differentiated and properly conceptualized, discussions about when it may be helpful to engage in prosocial deception are possible: that is, under what circumstances do the feelings and social needs of the self and other people override the duty of truthfulness? Under which conditions is it not only advisable but morally necessary to lie (e.g., to protect the lives, health, and well-being of innocent others[3])? A key consideration guiding dialogue and thought sharing is context sensitivity, something that is itself difficult for autistic persons. A white lie told in one situation, to one person, may have the intended prosocial outcome, but it would be a mistake to assume that it will generalize neatly to other persons or circumstances. As such, static scripts or references to lies that are “socially appropriate” or “inappropriate” will be misleading and unhelpful: instead we need to build our discussion around context and talk about the “if” and “when.”[57] Dimensions that are likely worthy of discussion include, but are not limited to, the following:

• Who is this person? (Sometimes telling the truth is hurtful but other times telling the truth and offering criticisms actually increases social solidarity, affection, and intimacy.)

• What is the truth? Is it hurtful/harmful to me or others? (If so, how so?)

• How important is the truth to me or others? (Does the truth matter in this situation?)

• Should the truth be bluntly or tactfully delivered? (Sometimes telling the blunt truth is valued—it can even be funny or endearing—but other times tact is advisable.)

• Is this a situation where saying nothing is best?

Conversations need to include sufficient detail so that a specific situation (hypothetical or real; about self, other, or fictional protagonists) can be jointly analyzed by discussants.[c] Due to inevitable situational variation, there is no expectation for correct or singular answers. Instead, it is made explicit that people often differ in their appraisals of how and when someone should or should not lie and when differences occur, they can be explored, shared, and may remain unresolved. As such, the therapeutic goal is not to produce socially appropriate white lies (although this may occur), but to understand deception in complex ways so as to evaluate prosocial lying in context and as a potential response to the social milieu.

Prior to teaching, the adult (e.g., clinician, caregiver) ideally adopts the habit of monitoring, evaluating, and informally recording their own lies as well as instances of polite versus blunt truth telling. These can be shared with the client during conversation to further illustrate variation in the white-lie calculus, the range of situations that produce different kinds of lies, and how lies might be experienced by both the lie-teller and the lie-recipient. Talk that is rich in mental state references, especially embedded mental states (e.g., I didn't want Kenna to know that…) should be especially therapeutic. This exercise also reveals why simple rules or scripts about lie telling are woefully inadequate (if not misleading or frightening). For example, a recent informal search of ready-made teaching materials on the topic of prosocial and antisocial lying turned up the following (usual) poor advice (inaccuracies are alluded to in parentheses):

• “It's only okay to lie if you are protecting someone else's feelings” (so I can't lie to protect me?).

• “Always tell the truth to friends, teachers, and parents” (always? And does this mean lying to anyone else is okay?).

• “People will like me more when I tell the truth” (no matter what I am saying?).

• “It's never OKAY to lie” (really? never ever?).

Lie Typologies

This is too complex for me to think through properly.

– autistic adult on white lie telling[2]

The kinds of conversations described earlier may be helpful for the development of prosocial lie comprehension or production, but for some—and precisely because each situation is contextually complex—analyses of this kind may also present as an unintended working memory problem. Indeed, many autistic persons experience persistent difficulties understanding the social functions of lying, the different classes of lies, and the extent to which society condemns (or does not condemn) these. Yet, previous research has been conducted to identify and categorize lies on these bases,[8] [58] and some typologies may offer accurate descriptions that can help people with autism understand lies and the contexts and circumstances that make lies antisocial or prosocial (or no big deal) from a societal perspective.

In the early literature, a simple and straightforward approach was to dichotomize lies into two broad groups reflecting benign lies (harmless and acceptable) and exploitative lies (harmful and unacceptable).[59] In a more recent and sophisticated typology developed on the basis of rich qualitative evidence, Bryant[8] established three lie categories (real lies, white lies, gray lies) based on the lie's intention, directness, effects, and the potential to harm (see [Table 3] for a simplification of Bryant's typology).

Table 3 Real Lies, White Lies, and Gray Lies[8]

Real lies Relatively uncommon	White lies Very common, for many people this happens daily	Gray lies Frequency depends on unique circumstances
- Unacceptable - Malicious, bad intent - Complete or substantive fabrications of truth - “Self-oriented” (said for unjust/selfish benefit of self) - Can have serious consequences and potential for harm - Can be lies of commission or omission	- Generally acceptable - Altruistic, good intent - Trivial consequences - Untrue or partially true - “Self” or “other-oriented” (said for benefit of self or other) - Goal is tactfulness, smooth social interaction - Truth would cause tension, stress, or embarrassment - Can be lies of commission or omission	- Lie is ambiguous: has features of real lies and white lies (e.g., complete fabrication, good intent, but actually not helpful to lie recipient and truth would be more helpful) - Can be like real lies but justifiable given the circumstance (e.g., necessary trade for a greater benefit or a lie that is acceptable because under the circumstances, almost all people would do it)

Such schemes take advantage of the systemizing tendency in autism (described earlier) and are reminiscent of the categories developed by autistic adults that were derived on the basis of decades of observation, pattern finding, and rule extraction. Any such scheme can be elaborated or simplified as desired but at its core, it is meant to offer simplicity through the use of meaningful and societally accurate categories to evaluate the uses and acceptability of different lie types (told or received). Lie typologies also allow the individual to work in reverse; although the conversation lessons described earlier require induction and conjecture to reveal patterns, lie typologies are deductive: the categories are given and only the fit between an instance and a lie type need be evaluated.

Conclusions

In summary, prosocial lies are common, harmless lies that benefit the self and others and autistic individuals tend to be less skilled and/or less willing to tell white lies for a variety of reasons. White-lie telling will not be for everyone, in which case advocacy should be pursued. Nevertheless, teaching the distinction between different kinds of falsehoods, having conversations to analyze white-lie telling in context, and using typologies to evaluate lies may assist autistic persons in assessing the morality and utility of prosocial deception.

Conflict of Interest

Other financial or non-financial interests: Co-owner of Theory of Mind Inventory, LLC.

^a Autism is both a medical condition that gives rise to disability and a neurobiological and cognitive difference. Autism spectrum disorder and autism spectrum condition are referred to here as “autism.” I employ the term “autistic” (to reflect identity-first language which is, at present, the preferred terminology for many self-advocates). Person-first language (e.g., “individuals with autism”) is also employed and the mixing of these terms is intentional and designed to respect the diversity in language preferences that exist in the broad community of stakeholders. In addition, “atypical” represents “neurodivergent” as a comparative term. “Atypical” does not represent “incorrect,” just as “neurotypical” does not represent “correct.”

^b The term “bullshit” and “bullshitting” are accepted scientific terms.

^c Materials including situational and discussion prompts and video examples of different kinds of prosocial lies are available at theoryofmindinventory.com.

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Publication History

Article published online:
27 July 2022