Philosophische Kriterien personaler Identität und neurowissenschaftliche Perspektive

Zusammenfassung

Der vorgelegte Aufsatz befragt verschiedene philosophische Kriterien personaler Identität nach ihrer Relevanz aus Sicht der Neurowissenschaften. Sowohl das psychologische als das somatische Kriterium wird zurückgewiesen. Demgegenüber verspricht das narrative Kriterium eine hohe Kongruenz zu neurowissenschaftlichen Konzepten und Fragestellungen. Zugleich impliziert es ein immanent ethisches Moment jenseits geistig-immaterieller oder genetisch-manifester Grundlagen und provoziert eine ganz eigene – für die Neurowissenschaft durchaus herausfordernde – ethische Perspektive.

Summary

Contemporary philosophy provides us with mainly three answers concerning the question of personal identity or identity over time: either a psychological or a somatic or a narrative approach. In this paper I claim that neither the somatic nor the psychological approach is compatible with basic conceptions in neuroscience, while the narrative criterion of personal identity on the other hand indeed seems to be. Additionally, the narrative criterion implicitly bears an ethical dimension and thus may become a relevant conception from a neuro-ethical point of view.

Schlüsselwörter

Personale Identität - neuronale Zustände - Narration - neurowissenschaftliche Relevanz

Keywords

Personal identity - neuronal states - narration - scientific relevance

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