Straw men and black swans: the philosophy of contemporary science

Sir,

From the perspective of an ordinary practising scientist, Milgrom[ ¹ ] represents the logical structure of science in a way that does not promote an accurate understanding of modern science. I would have expected that a paper from a senior researcher, who claims to have sought advice on philosophy, published in a peer-reviewed journal might have actually addressed the philosophy of science in a meaningful way.

Rather, the philosophical discussion takes aim at a “straw man” instead of real science. It criticises what it calls “science's primarily inductive logical structure”. The example provided (white/black swans) is actually a common illustration of “naïve (or classical) inductivism” (see, for example, Ref.[ ² ]). This philosophical approach had its limitations exposed a long time ago. No serious contemporary scientist would accept naïve inductivism as a realistic model for scientific endeavour. Therefore, it is not science's primary logical structure, as Milgrom contends.

The concept of falsification, originally formulated by Karl Popper,[ ³ ] would make a more realistic candidate for modem science's primary logical structure. The “swan” example can be used to contrast these two approaches. Simply put, to “prove” the hypothesis that all swans are white the naïve inductivist has the impossible task of observing all swans through all time; however the observation of a single black swan would falsify this hypothesis. The move away from inductivism was driven, in large part, by Popper's massively influential text “The Logic of Scientific Discovery”.[ ³ ] This work is actually referenced in the paper [Ref. 14(a)], but as what seems to be an implied example of the Post-Modernist attack on logical positivism (Popper, of course, was not a Post-Modernist, but defined himself as a Critical Rationalist).

The author's apparent awareness of Popper's work makes it very peculiar that he continues to attack the “straw man” of naïve inductivism, rather than engaging with the more relevant (and stronger) falsificationist position generally aspired to in modern science. (For example, as part of my education as a scientist over 20 years ago, I was made to study Popper as part of my physics degree. This, naturally, included an exposé of inductivism along with subsequent criticisms of the falsificationalist approach. I believe it was a second year topic.) Of course, this more realistic position makes a more difficult, but by no means unassailable, target (see, for example, Ref.[ ⁴ ]).

Similarly, when the author outlines his view of the unwillingness of scientists to reconcile themselves to new observations that do not fit into current theoretical models he neglects to mention the seminal analysis of this issue by Kuhn.[ ⁵ ] It is from this work that we get the notion of “Paradigms” in science and “Paradigm Shift”. Whether the author would agree with the analysis or not (and it does have notable critics among scientists), it is of such importance in context of the debate he frames that to omit it is a serious flaw. (This was, again, part of my undergraduate training as a physicist.)

More recent philosophical positions that do not figure in this assault on the “straw man” of naïve inductivism include the work of lmre Lakatos,[ ⁶ ] who proposed that the object of evaluation should be whole “research programmes” rather than individual hypotheses, and Feyerabend[ ^7,8 ] who objected to any single prescriptive scientific method. It is not my contention that these approaches are complete or flawless descriptions of modem science, but that they are so influential that a discussion of the philosophy of contemporary science is incomplete without them. By extension, any critique of science that ignores the major philosophical analyses of science is fatally flawed.

The author then states: “Consequently, positive results from even the highest standard scientific trials are rejected by those who will not accept homeopathy's claIm that remedies diluted out of molecular existence might have any effect. For black swans, read homeopathy.” This is an odd assertion. First, the author goes to some lengths to challenge the suitability of what would generally be considered to be “the highest standard scientific trials” (double blind RCTs) for assessing homeopathic interventions. If the outcomes of such trails are just being ignored this would seem to be unnecessary. Second, this very strong assertion is not backed up by any references. Finally, as previously discussed, the real scientists actually look for “black swans”.

• References

• 1 Milgrom L.R. Conspicuous by its absence: the Memory of Water, macro-entanglement, and the possibility of homeopathy. Homp 2007; 96: 209-219.
• 2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/lnductivism.
• 3 Popper K. The logic of scientific discovery. New York: Basic Books; 1959.
• 4 Cartwright N., Frigg R. String theory under scrutiny. Phys World 2007; 20 (09) 14-15.
• 5 Kuhn T.S. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1962.
• 6 Lakatos I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers. vol. 1. 1978.
• 7 Feyerabend P. Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press; 1975.
• 8 Feyerabend P. Science in a Free Society. London: Routledge; 1979.