Die Mentalismusfrage

Zusammenfassung

Die Mentalismusfrage zielt auf ein zentrales theoretisches Problem der Psychiatrie: Wie ist das Psychische richtig zu verstehen? Dass diese Frage bis heute nicht schlüssig beantwortet werden kann, liegt nicht allein an unserer empirischen Ignoranz. Die Schwierigkeiten, eine Antwort zu finden, sind ebenso auf die bisherige Art der wissenschaftlichen Herangehensweise, d. h. auf Forschungsmethodik und Modellierung, zurückzuführen. Um etwas Licht in die infrage stehenden Zusammenhänge zu werfen, werde ich fünf Fragen stellen und tentativ zu beantworten versuchen – Fragen nach dem ontologischen Status der mentalen Sphäre, nach der Beschreibung und der Erkenntnis des Mentalen und nach seiner Stellung in der Naturgeschichte und seiner erfolgversprechendsten wissenschaftlichen Modellierung. Ziel meiner Diskussion der Fragen wird es sein, den Stellenwert der Mentalismusfrage zu verdeutlichen, das Verständnis für die zugrundeliegenden Probleme zu vertiefen und um für eine theoretische Re-Orientierung des Faches zu werben.

Summary

The status of mentalism is highly controversial. How should we understand the mind from an evidence-based perspective as psychiatrists? The difficulties in answering this question are empirical as well as theoretical in kind. In order to elucidate some of the problems that determine the question of mentalism, I shall pose and answer five questions concerning the ontology of the mental, an adequate descriptive account of the mind, the best epistemic approach, the mind’s role in cultural evolution and the best way to scientifically model the mind-brain-behaviorenvironment-conundrum. My main aim is to highlight the importance of these “eternal” questions and the need for a more “enactivist” re-orientation of psychiatric and psychotherapeutic research.

Schlüsselwörter

Leib-Seele-Problem - wissenschaftlicher Materialismus - Alltagspsychologie - kulturelle Evolution - Enaktivismus

Keywords

Mind-body problem - scientific materialism - folk psychology - cultural evolution - enactivsm

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